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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4282
How cash transfers made to women are used has 
important implications for models of household 
behavior and for the design of social programs. In this 
paper, the authors use the randomized introduction of 
an unconditional cash transfer to poor women in rural 
Ecuador to analyze the effect of transfers on the food 
Engel curve. There are two main findings. First, the 
authors show that households randomly assigned to 
receive Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) transfers 
have a significantly higher food share in expenditures 
than those that were randomly assigned to the control 
group. Second, they show that the rising food share 
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to evaluate the impact of social programs. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, 
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among BDH beneficiaries is found among households 
that have both adult males and females, but not among 
households that only have adult females. Bargaining 
power between men and women is likely to be important 
in mixed-adult households, but not among female-
only households, where there are no men to bargain 
with. Finally, the authors show that within mixed-adult 
households, program effects are only significant in 
households in which the initial bargaining capacity of 
women was likely to be weak. This pattern of results is 
consistent with an increase in the bargaining power of 
women in households that received BDH transfers. 
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Cash transfer programs have become increasingly popular in developing countries.  This 
paper analyzes the effect of a cash transfer program in rural areas in Ecuador, the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH), on the food Engel curve.  The BDH makes US $15 monthly cash transfers to poor 
women.  During the roll-out of the BDH program, a group of eligible households was randomly 
assigned into a “treatment” group eligible for transfers and a “control” group that was ineligible for 
the study period.  Data on both groups were collected at baseline, before households started receiving 
transfers, and at follow-up, approximately 18 months later.  This experimental design allows us to 
analyze whether transfers made by the BDH are spent like other sources of income. 
In the textbook example, all household members maximize a join utility function (Becker 
1981).  A cash transfer shifts out the household budget constraint.  The composition of expenditures 
then changes as households move along the Engel curve that relates expenditures on a particular item 
or group of items to total expenditures.  Neither the source of the additional income nor who within 
the household receives the transfer matters.   
In practice, there are a variety of reasons why cash transfers like those made by the BDH may 
be used differently from other sources of income.  If transfer income is seen as more temporary or 
uncertain than other sources of income, a higher fraction of it might be saved or invested—for 
example, by purchasing productive assets.  Indeed, the permanent income hypothesis suggests that all 
of the additional “windfall” income would be saved.   
Even though transfers made by the BDH came with no strings attached, it was marketed as a 
“social program”.  During the roll-out of the program, a brief advertising campaign was launched, 
including informational spots on national television and in local radio stations.  These spots stressed 
that the BDH was a program that was meant to benefit poor children.  The advertising campaign may 
have led households to spend transfers in a way that took account of the goals of the program.  Recent 
research in psychology and economics shows that considerations such as “fairness” and “reciprocity” 
may be important determinants of decision-making, and that individuals keep “mental accounts” in 
their expenditures (see, in particular Thaler 1999, as well as the review papers by Fehr and Gachter 
2000, Fehr and Schmidt 2007, and the edited volume by Kahneman and Tversky 2000).  In the United 
States, studies of food stamp “cashouts” show that families spend more of their food stamp income on 
food than is the case for other sources of income (Fraker, Martini, and Ohls 1995; Currie 1998).  
Kooreman (2000) finds that spending on children’s clothing out of child benefit income in the 
Netherlands is much larger than out of other income.  Jacoby (2002) argues that there are also 
“flypaper effects” associated with a school feeding program in the Philippines.  On the other hand, 
Edmonds (2002) fails to reject the null that child benefit income is used like other income in 
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sources of income in South Africa, so that “a rand is always a rand”.   
The gender of recipients of cash transfers like those made by the BDH may also be important 
in determining how transfer income is used.  If pooling of resources within the household is 
incomplete, as predicted by a variety of non-unitary household models (for example, Chiappori 1988; 
1992; Bourguignon et al. 1993), cash transfers to women may increase their bargaining capacity 
within the household and result in a pattern of expenditures that better reflects their preferences.  A 
handful of papers provide evidence that women have different preferences over expenditures from 
men.  Thomas (1990) uses data for urban Brazil to show that the effect of non-earned maternal 
income on nutrient demand is between four and seven times larger than the corresponding effect of 
non-earned paternal income.  Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) argue that the share of income controlled 
by women is positively correlated with food shares in Cote d’Ivoire.  Doss (2005) shows that the 
share of assets and the share of land owned by women are positively associated with higher food 
expenditures among rural households in Ghana.  Lundberg, Pollack, and Wales (1997) exploit a 
sudden, unanticipated policy reform in the United Kingdom.  In this reform, a universal child benefit, 
which had primarily consisted of reductions in taxes withheld from the paycheck of a child’s father, 
was replaced by a direct cash payment made to the child’s mother.  Lundberg, Pollack, and Wales 
argue that this reform led to a substantial increase in expenditures on women’s clothing and children’s 
clothing relative to men’s clothing—see also Ward-Batts (2003) for another paper that reaches similar 
conclusions with the same data.  On the other hand, Hotchkiss (2005) shows that childless couples, 
who were unaffected by the reform, also had large increases in expenditures on women’s clothing, 
which casts doubts on the Lundberg, Pollack and Wales identification strategy.   
There are also a handful of papers that analyze the effect of “conditional cash transfer” 
programs in Latin America.  In these programs, women receive transfers only if they comply with a 
number of conditions—women with pre-school-aged children must make regular visits to health 
centers, where children receive growth monitoring and food supplements, if necessary, and women 
with school-aged children must ensure that they are enrolled in school and attend regularly.  The best 
known of these programs is the PROGRESA program in Mexico (now called Oportunidades).   
A number of papers analyze the impact of PROGRESA on expenditures, and arrive at 
different conclusions.  Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) use the random assignment of PROGRESA to 
poor communities to show that households eligible for transfers consumed more food than non-
eligible households; however, Hoddinott and Skoufias do not analyze changes in the food share, so it 
is not clear whether the increase in food expenditures is a result of higher incomes or changes in 
consumption patterns.  Attanasio and Lechene (2002) explicitly focus on the shares of expenditures 
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Using a variety of instrumental-variables techniques that exploit the randomized introduction of the 
program, they conclude that households that received PROGRESA transfers had significantly higher 
food shares in expenditures.  Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas (2004) also analyze the impact of 
PROGRESA on the composition of expenditures, and conclude that transfers were more likely to be 
invested, and were more likely to be spent on goods that benefited children, than other sources of 
income.  Moreover, they show that changes in the composition of expenditures among PROGRESA 
beneficiaries were absent in single-parent households, which could be consistent with a bargaining 
power explanation.  Unlike Attanasio and Lechene, however, Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas 
conclude that PROGRESA beneficiaries had lower (rather than higher) food shares in expenditures 
after the program.   
Turning to other conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America, Attanasio and Mesnard 
(2005) use non-experimental methods to analyze the impact of the Colombian Familias en Acción 
program; they show that the program increased food expenditures by the same fraction as total 
expenditures—the Engel curves remained unchanged.  Finally, Maluccio and Flores (2004) exploit 
the random assignment of benefits in the Red de Protección Social program in Nicaragua.  They show 
that households that were eligible for transfers had significantly higher food shares in expenditures. 
How conditional cash transfers are used by households is an important policy question.  
However, analysis of conditional cash transfers does not in and of itself provide a straightforward test 
of the pooling hypothesis.  This is because the conditions attached to transfers are likely to affect the 
pattern of expenditures—see, in particular, the discussion in Attanasio and Lechene (2002).  The fact 
that the BDH did not require women to comply with any “conditions” to receive transfers arguably 
provides a cleaner test of whether the simple textbook model of the household is an accurate 
approximation to reality.     
In this paper we focus on differences in the share of expenditures devoted to food between 
households randomly assigned to receive BDH transfers—lottery winners—and households randomly 
assigned to the control group—lottery losers.  The main findings of the paper are two.  We first show 
that BDH lottery winners have a significantly higher food share in expenditures than lottery losers.  
As is discussed above, this is in principle consistent with a variety of explanations.  We then show 
that the pattern of program effects is generally consistent with an increase in the bargaining capacity 
of women. 
To analyze whether the gender of recipients was important, we split the sample into 
households that have both adult men and women, and those that have adult women only.  If the rising 
food share among BDH beneficiaries were a result of the increasing bargaining power of women, we 
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bargaining is an issue, but not among female-only households, where there are no men to bargain 
with.  This is in fact the pattern of program effects we find.  We might also expect that the BDH 
would have the largest effects in mixed-adult households in which the initial control of women over 
resources was weak.  Although there is no direct measure of bargaining capacity within the household 
in our data, the relative education of men and women is likely to be a reasonable proxy—see 
Frankenberg and Thomas (2003) for a general discussion, and Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas 
(2001) for an application.  We show that, among mixed-adult households, BDH program effects are 
larger when women have less schooling than men.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we describe the data and the BDH 
evaluation experiment.  Section 3 discusses our methodology and presents results.  We conclude in 
section 4. 
 
2.  Program design, evaluation, and data
1
A.  The BDH program
Ecuador has had a nationwide cash transfer program in place for approximately a decade.  
The first of these programs, the Bono Solidario, was created in 1998.  Its goal was to make transfers 
to poor households as Ecuador recovered from an economic crisis.  (GDP per capita contracted by 7.7 
percent between 1998 and 1999.)  As originally envisioned, transfers made by the Bono Solidario 
were meant to be temporary.  In practice, however, the program continued well after recovery from 
the crisis. 
  Individual payments made by the Bono Solidario program were small—$15 per month per 
eligible family—but the scope of the program was large: In 2002, it accounted for approximately 0.75 
percentage points of GDP.  (Ecuador adopted the US dollar as national currency in January 2000.)  
Payments were intended to be made to poor households.  However, because there were no clear 
selection criteria, households essentially signed up on a first-come, first-served basis.  As a result, 
many poor households did not receive transfers, and a substantial fraction of transfers were received 
by non-poor households.  In 1999, 49.8 percent of families in the poorest quintile received transfers, 
and 27.4 percent of families in the top two wealthiest quintiles received transfers. (These statistics are 
based on calculations from household survey data using the nationally representative 1999 Ecuador 
Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, the multi-purpose household survey intermittently conducted in 
Ecuador.) 
                                                 
1 This section borrows considerably from the descriptions in Schady and Araujo (2006) and Paxson and Schady 
(2007). 
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Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH).  The BDH differs from the Bono Solidario in that it is means-
tested.  Starting in 2001, the government of Ecuador invested significant effort into developing a 
family means-test.  Fully 85 percent of families in rural areas and poorer urban areas of Ecuador were 
surveyed and assigned a poverty index (called the Selben index).  This index is used to assess 
eligibility for the BDH—only families in the first two quintiles of the Selben index are eligible for 
transfers of $15 per month.
2  BDH transfers are relatively small in magnitude—in our sample, they 
account for approximately 8.9 percent of expenditures of the median household.  Transfers are made 
through the banking system.  The program rules state that transfers must be made to women if there 
are any adult women in the household, and women must physically go to a nearby bank to receive 
cash.
3  (There is a much smaller version of the program that covers the elderly, regardless whether 
they are men or women; these households are not included in our sample.)  
Earlier work on the BDH program has focused on its impact on overall consumption, 
schooling, and child health and development.  A joint document by the World Bank and the 
Secretaría Técnica del Frente Social (2006) in Ecuador shows that households that received BDH 
transfers did not have significantly higher overall per capita consumption.  This is surprising, but can 
be explained, in an accounting sense, by large reductions in child labor among households that 
received transfers.  This same analysis finds no evidence of changes in adult labor market 
participation.  Schady and Araujo (2006) show that the BDH program had a large, positive effect on 
school enrollment.  Finally, Paxson and Schady (2007) show that BDH transfers resulted in 
improvements in measures of nutritional status, motor development, cognitive development, and 
psycho-emotional development among children of pre-school age in rural areas, especially among the 
poorest households.  There is no earlier work on the effect of BDH transfers on the composition of 
household expenditures. 
 
B.  The experiment
  In a similar fashion to the roll-out of PROGRESA, an evaluation design was explicitly 
incorporated into the BDH.  The sample for this evaluation was drawn from the Selben rosters of four 
of the 22 provinces in the country: Carchi, Imbabura, Cotopaxi, and Tungurahua.  All four provinces 
are in the sierra (or highlands) region of the country.  The sampling framework followed a two-stage 
                                                 
2 In January 2007, the administration of newly-elected President Rafael Correa announced that transfers to all 
eligible households would be doubled from $15 per month to $30 per month.  However, this reform falls well 
after the time period considered in our study. 
3 There are only 4 households in our sample that receive BDH transfers in spite of the fact that there are no adult 
women in the household. 
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parishes, a sample of 1,488 households was randomly selected.  (Parishes are the lowest geographic 
unit in Ecuador, roughly equivalent to counties in the United States.)  Households that had previously 
received transfers from the Bono Solidario were excluded from the sample, as were households 
whose Selben score made them ineligible fir the BDH.  One-half of households in the sample were 
randomly assigned to a treatment group, and the other half to the control group.  We refer to the first 
group as “lottery winners” and the second group as “lottery losers”.  Lottery losers were taken off the 
roster of households that could be activated for BDH transfers.  Note that households in the two 
groups lived in the same neighborhoods or villages—unlike the evaluation of PROGRESA and most 
other cash transfer programs in Latin America, where random assignment took place at the 
community level. 
Table 1 uses data from the baseline survey to compare the characteristics of households that 
were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups (upper panel), and those that received and 
did not receive BDH transfers (lower panel).  The upper panel of the table shows that random 
assignment was successful: Differences between lottery winners and lottery losers at baseline in a 
number of characteristics—including expenditure patterns, the food share, household size, and the 
characteristics of the household head—are small, and are not significant at conventional levels.   
Although random assignment was successful, there is unfortunately a very imperfect match 
between assignment to a study group and receipt of BDH transfers.  Program take-up among lottery 
winners was 78 percent; lack of information, the cost of traveling to a bank, and stigma may all have 
discouraged some households from receiving transfers.  More worryingly, 42 percent of households 
assigned to the control group received transfers.  The precise reasons for this substantial 
contamination are unclear.  Conversations with BDH administrators suggest that the list of 
households that had been randomized out was not passed on in time to operational staff activating 
households for transfers.  This situation was corrected after a few weeks, but withholding transfers 
from households that had already begun to receive them was judged to be politically imprudent (see 
Schady and Araujo 2006).   
The lower panel of Table 1 shows that there are clear baseline differences between 
households that received BDH transfers and those that did not.  Households that received transfers 
had lower food expenditures and lower food shares; they tended to be larger; the heads of households 
that received transfers had an average of two-thirds of a year of more education, are approximately 
two years younger, and are somewhat more likely to be male.  Many of these differences are 
significant.  Table 1 clearly suggests that the likelihood of receiving BDH cannot be treated as 
random, and that it is important to use estimation methods that take this into account. 
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the criteria for selection into the BDH evaluation, households in the study sample tend to be poorer.  
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for selected characteristics of households in the 
study sample at baseline, for all households in the country, and for all households in the parishes 
included in this study.  The samples for these calculations are limited to households with children 
ages 6-17.  National averages are based on the 1999 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, and averages 
for the parishes in the study sample are based on the 2001 Population Census.  Table 2 shows that 
households in the sample have more members and fewer rooms than other households, are less likely 
to have access to piped water or a toilet, and are more likely to have a dirt floor in their home.  Mean 
years of schooling of household heads in the study sample are more than two-and-a-half years lower 
than those of other households.  These patterns are apparent both in comparison with other 
households in these same parishes, as well as in comparison with national averages.   
 
C.  Data
The main sources of data used in this paper are the baseline and follow-up surveys designed 
for the BDH evaluation.  Both surveys were carried out by an independent firm that had no 
association with the BDH program, the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador.  The baseline 
survey was collected between June and August 2003, and the follow-up survey was collected between 
January and March 2005.  The analysis in this paper is limited to households living in rural areas. 
The survey instrument included a roster of household members and, inter alia, information on 
the level of schooling attained, marital status, and languages spoken by all adults; school enrollment, 
grade progression, and work of all children ages 6-17; an extensive module on household 
expenditures, which closely followed the structure of the 1999 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida; and 
a module on dwelling conditions, ownership of durable goods, and access to public services.  We 
aggregated expenditures into a total consumption aggregate, and food expenditures into a food 
consumption aggregate.  Food consumption includes both actual expenditures (including food 
consumed outside the home), as well as home production in the two weeks prior to the survey.  Other 
expenditures include modules on schooling, health, entertainment, items for personal hygiene, 
clothing, shoes, transportation, services, and expenditures on durables.  The items asked in the 
expenditure module, and the recall periods for each item, are exactly the same in the two surveys.  We 
deflated prices across provinces using data on the prices of a basket of food items collected at the 
time of the baseline survey, and used the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to make the prices comparable 
between the two surveys.   
  7  There are 773 households in rural areas in the BDH evaluation surveys that were visited in 
both the baseline and follow-up surveys.  Attrition over the study period was low: 94.1 percent of 
households were re-interviewed.  Among households who attrited, most had moved and could not be 
found (4.2 percent), with smaller numbers where the household was located but no qualified 
respondent was available despite repeated visits (1.0 percent), or the respondent refused to participate 
in the survey (0.5 percent).  There is no relation between assignment to the study groups and attrition, 
and baseline differences between attrited and other households in per capita expenditures, food 
expenditures, assets, and the education of adult males and females are small and insignificant.  
Attrition is most likely to introduce biases in estimation when there are large differences between 
attrited and other households (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt 1998), or when attrition is correlated 
with treatment status (Angrist 1997; Angrist et al. 2002), and there is no evidence that this is the case 
in our data.   
 
3. Results 
A.  Nonparametric results  
We begin our analysis with non-parametric regressions of the food share on the log of per 
capita expenditures at baseline and follow-up for households assigned to the treatment group—lottery 
winners—and households assigned to the control group—lottery losers.  These results are presented 
in Figure 1.  Note that this analysis only makes use of the random assignment into treatment and 
control groups, and not of the likely endogenous program take-up. 
The food Engel curves in Figure 1 generally present the typical downward-sloping pattern 
observed elsewhere.  With the exception of the poorest households, households with higher overall 
expenditures generally have lower food shares—Engel’s Law (Engel 1857).  The positive slope in the 
food Engel curve observed at the lowest expenditure levels is not uncommon (Thomas 1986), and has 
been documented before for Ecuador (Lanjouw and Lanjouw 1997).  One explanation that is 
consistent with this pattern is measurement error in food expenditures: If households buy some food 
items infrequently, for example because they buy in bulk, some households will not have purchased 
these items during the recall period considered in the surveys (the last two weeks).  These households 
will appear to have low overall expenditures and particularly low food expenditures (Lanjouw and 
Lanjouw 1997). 
By virtue of random assignment, we would expect that the food Engel curves at baseline for 
lottery winners and losers would be very close to each other.  The upper panel of Figure 1 shows that 
this is generally the case above the 25
th percentile of the distribution of log per capita expenditures.  
However, despite random assignment, the food Engel curve for the poorest lottery winners is below 
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for households in the lowest quartile is 2.8 percentage points.  We return to this point below. 
If BDH transfers were treated like other sources of income, households might move along 
their Engel curves in response to the program, although the fact that the program did not have an 
effect on total expenditures suggests that movement along the curves would be small.  Under this 
scenario, the curves for lottery winners and lottery losers at follow-up would look very similar to 
those at baseline.  The lower panel of Figure 1 shows that this is not the case.  Instead, the curves for 
both lottery winners and lottery losers have shifted down over the two-year period.  However, the 
shift for lottery winners is noticeably smaller.   
The downward shift in the food Engel curves over time is surprising, although it has been 
observed elsewhere—see Deaton and Dreze (2007) for a long time-series in India, and Maluccio and 
Flores (2004) in their analysis of the effect of the Red de Protección Social program in Nicaragua.  To 
gain a better understanding of this change, we make use of the 1999 and 2006 Ecuador Encuestas de 
Condiciones de Vida.  We limited the sample to households in the rural sierra, to make the coverage 
of the surveys comparable to that in the evaluation data, and calculated nonparametric regressions of 
the food share on log per capita expenditures.  On average, the food Engel curve using the Encuestas 
de Condiciones de Vida in 2006 is 3.9 percentage points below that in 1999.  Reassuringly, the 
downward shift in the food Engel curves in rural areas of the sierra in Ecuador we observe in the 
BDH evaluation sample is also apparent in other data sources.   
We briefly discuss some possible reasons for the downward shift in the food Engel curves in 
Ecuador over time.  First, there may have been changes in relative prices—for example, a change in 
the price of food, relative to other items in the household budget.  Both the BDH evaluation surveys 
and the Encuestas de Condiciones de Vida collect village-level information on a basket of food items, 
which are then used to deflate expenditures spatially.  However, neither survey collects information 
on the prices of non-food items, so it is not possible to use these data to assess changes in relative 
prices.   
Seasonal patterns could also explain the decline in the food Engel curve—recall that the 
baseline evaluation survey was collected between June and August, while the follow-up survey was 
collected between January and March.  The 2006 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida collected data in 
every month of the year.  The average food share in rural areas in the sierra is 0.473 in January-March 
period and 0.475 in the June-August period.  Thus, it does not appear that seasonal effects are 
important.     
Finally, measurement error also seems an unlikely candidate to explain the falling food Engel 
curve in the evaluation surveys, since the expenditure modules and recall periods were identical 
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were stable over this period—the national currency in Ecuador at the time of both surveys was the US 
dollar.  We therefore do not have a satisfactory explanation for the secular downward shift in the 
Engel curve in our evaluation sample or in the rural sierra in general. 
More importantly for our analysis, however, the lower panel of Figure 1 shows that the food 
Engel curve for lottery winners at follow-up is everywhere above that for lottery losers.  Note that this 
is a very different pattern of what we find at baseline.  Figure 1 thus suggests that BDH transfers led 
households to shift expenditures towards food.   
 
B.  Parametric results
We next turn to two parametric specifications of the data.  In the first of these, we use only 
data from the follow-up survey: 
(1)  Wht= Zhδ + f(ln(x/n))ht + Xhtβ + ψc +  εht, 
where Wht is the food share at the time of the follow-up survey; Zh is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value of one if a family was a lottery winner; f(ln(x/n))ht is a flexible formulation of per capita 
expenditures.  In practice, we use a quadratic in expenditures—we consistently fail to find evidence 
that higher-order terms are important (see Attanasio and Lechene 2002, and Blundell, Banks, and 
Lewbell 1997 for a similar parametrization of total expenditures in Engel curve analysis); Xht is a 
vector of demographic controls, including the log of household size, and indicator variables for the 
number of family members in 5 age ranges (0 to 5, 6 to 17, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, and 65 or older) 
interacted with gender; ψc is a vector of 45 canton fixed effects; εht, finally, is the regression error 
term.  Standard errors are corrected for within-parish correlation.  The parameter of interest is δ, 
which tests for differences in the food Engel curve between lottery winners and lottery losers.  Note 
that this is a “lottery effect” that is exogenous as it relies only on the random assignment.   
  There are a number of considerations that require discussion in this specification.  The first of 
these is that estimation of (1) above allows the BDH to have an effect on the intercept but not the 
slope of the Engel curve.  In practice we consistently fail to find evidence of BDH effects on the slope 
of the Engel curve, and therefore use this more parsimonious specification.  A second concern is 
measurement error.  Measurement error in per capita expenditures would bias the linear and quadratic 
terms in ln(x/n)ht above, and could also bias estimates of the program effect on the Engel curve if per 
capita expenditures at follow-up are not orthogonal with participation in the BDH program.  We 
therefore also present estimates in which total per capita expenditures (and its square) are 
instrumented with per capita non-food expenditures (and its square). 
  10  Another consideration is pre-existing differences between lottery winners and lottery losers 
that remain despite random assignment.  As Figure 1 shows, there is some evidence that the food 
share at baseline was lower among lottery winners than among lottery losers.  We therefore also run a 
specification in first-differences: 
(2)  ΔWh = Zhδ + Δf(ln(x/n))h + ΔXhβ  + ψc +  Δεh, 
where Δ represents changes between baseline and follow-up.  This approach sweeps out all time-
invariant differences between lottery winners and lottery losers, including differences in the baseline 
food share. 
Results from these calculations are presented in Table 3.  The first four specifications are 
OLS.  The first of these includes no controls; this specification therefore ignores any effect that BDH 
transfers may have had on total expenditures.  The second specification includes linear and quadratic 
terms in the log of per capita expenditures.  The third specification supplements this with the vector 
of demographic controls.  The fourth specification also includes 45 canton fixed effects.  In the fifth 
specification, finally, the log per capita expenditures (and its square) are instrumented with the log of 
nonfood expenditures (and its square).
4  The upper panel in the table presents results based on the 
single-difference specification, while results from the double-difference specification are reported in 
the lower panel. 
The single-difference estimates suggest that the food share at follow-up is between 1.7 and 
2.5 percentage points higher among lottery winners than among lottery losers.  All of the program 
effects estimated by OLS are significant at the 5 percent level or better.  When per capita 
expenditures is instrumented, the coefficient on lottery winners falls somewhat, and the standard error 
increases; as a result, these estimates are no longer significant at conventional levels.  However, the 
point estimate in the IV specification is close to and well within the confidence interval of the OLS 
estimates.  The log of per capita expenditures has the concave profile apparent in Figure 1 in the OLS 
specifications; once expenditures are instrumented, the food share falls monotonically with 
expenditures, as predicted by Engel’s Law.   
The double-difference estimates in the lower panel of the table are noticeably larger, as one 
would expect given the lower food share among lottery winners at baseline.  These estimates suggest 
that the food share among lottery winners is between 2.9 and 4.0 percentage points higher than among 
lottery losers.  As before, the coefficient on households randomly assigned to receive BDH transfers 
                                                 
4 Non-food expenditures are highly correlated with total expenditures.  In a regression of the log of total 
expenditures on the log of nonfood expenditures, including the demographic controls and the canton fixed 
effects, the coefficient on non-food expenditures is 0.459 (with a standard error of 0.011); in a comparable 
regression in first differences, the coefficient is 0.395 (with a standard error of 0.014). 
  11is significant in all OLS specifications; in the IV specification the point estimate is smaller, and the 
standard errors are larger. 
How large are these effects of the BDH on the food share?  As is discussed above, there was 
unfortunately substantial contamination of the control group in the BDH experiment.  This will tend 
to dampen any effect the program may have had on food shares estimated in (1) and (2).  The 
coefficient δ can therefore best be understood as a lower bound of the underlying program effect.  As 
an alternative, it is possible to use the randomized assignment into study groups as an instrument for 
actual receipt of BDH transfers (Imbens and Angrist 1994).  For this purpose, we obtained data from 
Banred, the consortium of banks that pay BDH benefits, on total transfers collected by every 
household in the sample between January 2004 and July 2005.  (Results are very similar when, 
instead of the banking data, we use the responses provided in the follow-up survey about receipt of 
BDH transfers.)  As is well known, these regressions estimate Local Average Treatment Effects 
(LATE).  These are estimates of the effect of BDH transfers on the food share for households whose 
probability of receiving transfers was affected by the lottery—“compliers”, in the language of 
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996).  In these regressions, the coefficient on instrumented receipt of 
BDH transfers implies an effect on the food share of between 6.4 and 7.4 percentage points in the 
single-difference estimates, and of between 10.5 and 12.6 percentage points in the double-difference 
regressions.
5
We present two additional pieces of evidence that are consistent with an increase in 
expenditures on food by BDH lottery winners.  First, we reproduce a result from the paper by Paxson 
and Schady (2007) on the impact of the BDH on child health and development.  The follow-up survey 
used by Paxson and Schady asked BDH beneficiaries, all of whom were women, what they used 
BDH transfers for.  Table 4, reproduced from their paper, shows that nearly half (49.2 percent) 
reported that they spent all or most of the transfer on food, with much smaller fractions reporting that 
they spent all or most of the transfer on clothing (11.4 percent), education (10.7 percent), and health 
care (7.9 percent).  The survey also asked mothers who in the household (the mother, her partner or 
husband, or both) decided whether the transfers should be spent on food, clothing, etc.  For each type 
of expenditure, fewer than 2 percent of women reported that her husband or partner alone made 
decisions on how to spend the BDH transfer, and the majority indicated that they made spending 
decisions alone.  Second, we note that Paxson and Schady find that the BDH program resulted in 
                                                 
5 The first stage is highly significant: In a regression of the dummy for households that received transfers on a 
dummy for lottery winners and the full set of controls, the coefficient on lottery winners is 0.347, with a 
standard error of 0.048. 
  12substantial improvements in the hemoglobin status of children and their mothers, which is consistent 
with increased consumption of some foodstuffs, such as red meat and some fruits and vegetables. 
 
C.  Differences by the gender composition of households
As is discussed in the introduction, there are a variety of reasons why BDH transfers could 
have resulted in higher food shares, including uncertainty about how long transfers would be 
available, “mental accounting” that would take account of program goals, and the gender of transfer 
recipients.  We cannot formally test all of these possible explanations.  However, we present two 
pieces of evidence that suggest that the fact that BDH transfers were made to women was important.     
We first focus on comparisons between households that have both adult males and females 
(mixed-adult households), and those that only have adult females (female-only households), where 
adults are defined as household members aged 18 or older.  If women have preferences for food, and 
the increase in the food share reflects the increasing bargaining power of women over the budget, we 
would expect to see higher food shares among BDH recipients in mixed-adult households, where 
bargaining is an issue, but not among female-only households, where there are no men to bargain 
with.  As we show, this is the pattern we find.   
Second, if the rising food share in mixed-adult households reflects the increasing bargaining 
power of women, we would expect changes to be larger in households where the bargaining capacity 
of women was initially weak.  We do not have a direct measure of the bargaining capacity of men and 
women in the household.  However, the relative education of men and women in the household is 
likely to be a reasonable proxy.  We therefore generate a variable for the mean years of schooling of 
adult men and (separately) adult women in the household, and divide the sample into two groups: the 
first group corresponds to households in which the average education of men was higher than that of 
women, and the second group to households in which the average education of women was equal to 
or higher than that of men.  We then estimate BDH program effects separately in these two samples.  
If greater relative schooling leads to a higher bargaining capacity, as seems likely, we would expect to 
see larger program effects on the food share among households where women initially had 
(relatively) less education than in those where women had more education than men.  Once again, this 
is the pattern of program effects we find. 
As a way of motivating these results, we first run a regression of the food share at baseline on 
the full set of controls and a dummy variable for female-only households.  In this regression, the 
coefficient on the female-only dummy is 0.060, with a standard error of 0.028.  This coefficient has to 
be treated with some caution because of the possible endogeneity of household formation, and 
  13because adult women and men may have different caloric requirements.  Nevertheless, the result is 
consistent with women having preferences for food.     
We next turn to regressions of BDH program effects on the food share for the various 
breakdowns of the data described above.  These regressions are based on the double-difference 
specification, which is least likely to be biased.  Also, we do not run the regressions that include 
canton fixed effects because of the small number of observations for some breakdowns of the data—
for example, there are only 52 households that have only adult females at baseline and follow-up.  
The regressions that analyze BDH effects by the relative education of men and women all include a 
set of 13 dummy variables for the mean years of schooling of adults in the household (in integers).  
This is important, as mean schooling could be correlated with differences in relative schooling levels, 
and this could introduce biases.  Finally, note that differences in caloric requirements are less likely to 
be a source of concern for the results in Table 5 than for the baseline regressions: The comparisons in 
Table 5 are between lottery winners and lottery losers—conditional on being a female-only or a 
mixed-adult household, or conditional on educational levels of men and women in mixed-adult 
households.  Moreover, as is discussed above, there is no evidence that the BDH transfers affected the 
labor market participation of adult men or women. 
The results from these calculations are summarized in Table 5.  The top panel in the table 
presents the results from regressions for female-only and mixed-adult households.  The first row 
shows that the program effects in female-only households are very close to zero, while the second 
row shows large and significant effects on the food share among mixed-adult households.  The 
bottom panel presents the results for mixed-adult households with different amounts of relative 
schooling of men and women.  These regressions show that program effects on the food share are 
only significant in households in which the average schooling of women was lower than that of men.  
On average, the point estimates for the sample of households in which the schooling of women was 
lower are about 50 percent higher than those for the sample in which the education of women was as 
high as or higher than that of men.     
The results in Table 5 are not conclusive.  The standard errors are too large for the differences 
in program effects across categories to be significant.  Also, one would ideally want to have an 
experimental design in which transfers were randomly allocated to women in some households and to 
men in others.  Keeping these caveats in mind, however, Table 5 suggests that the upward shift in the 
food Engel curve observed among BDH lottery winners is at least in part a result of female 
preferences for food, as has been argued elsewhere (Thomas 1990; Hoddinot and Haddad 1995; Doss 
2005), and a greater control of women over household resources after the program was implemented, 
especially in households where the bargaining capacity of women was initially weak.   
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4. Conclusion 
  In the textbook model of the household, a dollar in the household budget is always a dollar, 
no matter where it comes from, or who within the household receives it.  There are a variety of 
reasons why this simple model may not hold.  One possibility is that the gender of recipient of cash 
transfers matters because women have different preferences from men, and household resources are 
not pooled completely. 
  There are a number of papers that test the unitary model of the household by comparing how 
resources controlled by men and women are used (for example, Thomas 1990 and 1994; Lundberg, 
Pollack, and Wales 1997).  A key concern in this literature, and one which is discussed in these 
papers, is the possible endogeneity of income controlled by men and women.  In this paper, we use 
random assignment of a cash transfer program to women in rural areas in Ecuador to analyze changes 
in the food Engel curve.  This experimental design limits concerns with endogeneity. 
The basic finding of the paper is that households that were randomly assigned to receive cash 
transfers have significantly higher food shares after the program.  These program effects on the food 
share are only found among mixed-adult households, and not among female-only households.  When 
the sample is limited to mixed-adult households, significant program effects are only found among 
households where the bargaining capacity of women was initially likely to be weaker.  Taken 
together, these results are hard to reconcile with the unitary model of the household, in which all 
resources are pooled.  Rather, they suggest that the bargaining position of women improved after they 
received transfers, and that women were then better able to influence the pattern of expenditures.  
The food share has been used as a measure of household welfare ever since Engel’s own 
pioneering study showed that the share of food in the budget decreases as income rises (Engel 1857).  
“Engel’s Law” is an empirical regularity and, as Figure 1 shows, it holds in Ecuador as well.  There 
are, however, numerous reasons why the food share is a poor welfare measure (see, in particular, the 
discussion in Deaton 1997).  In Ecuador, households that received cash transfers, and who 
presumably were better off as a result, have a higher food share, which clearly raises doubts about the 
usefulness of the food share as a welfare measure.  Moreover, the food Engel curves in rural Ecuador 
show significant downward drift.  This raises questions about a variety of applications which rely on a 
stable food share as a critical assumption.  For example, Costa (2001) uses data on the food and 
recreation shares in the United States over time to correct for bias in the consumer price index.  
Obviously, rural Ecuador and the United States are likely to differ in a large number of ways, but the 
results in this (and other recent) papers that show a shifting food Engel curve point to the risks 
inherent in assuming that the Engel curve is stable.     
  15The findings in this paper also have operational implications.  Conditional cash transfers in 
Latin America have received considerable attention, and with good reason.  For example, 
PROGRESA has been shown to have positive effects on school enrollment (Schultz 2004; Behrman, 
Sengupta, and Todd 2005) and child health (Gertler 2004; Behrman and Hoddinott 2005; Rivera et al. 
2004).  It is generally assumed that conditional cash transfers work through some combination of an 
income effect and the change in relative prices associated with the condition.  The analysis in this 
paper shows that another characteristic of these programs—the fact that transfers are made to 
women—may also be important.  Compelling households to comply with conditions is costly both for 
households and for the programs that are charged with monitoring compliance, so a better 
understanding of what features of conditional cash transfer programs affect outcomes clearly has 
operational implications.  More generally, the results in this paper show that the gender of participants 
is important for program design.  To date, this has received considerable attention in some areas in 
development, in particular in analysis of micro-finance schemes (for example, Pitt and Khandker 
1998; Morduch 1999), but less in others.  It is a fruitful area for additional experimentation and 
research.         
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  20Table 1: Descriptive statistics at baseline 
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Note: Standard errors corrected for within-parish clustering.  Sample size is 773. 
 
  21Table 2: Comparison of the evaluation sample with national and parish-level averages 
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Note: The table presents means and standard deviations.  Calculations from the 1998/99 LSMS and the 2001 
Census are limited to households with children ages 6-17; calculations from the census refer only to parishes 
included in the impact evaluation sample. 
Source: Schady and Araujo (2006) 
 
  22Table 3: Program effects on food share 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Single difference 
































Demographic  controls  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Canton FE  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.005 0.051 0.073 0.107   
  Double-difference 
































Demographic  controls  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Canton FE  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.007 0.090 0.099 0.127   
Note: The dependent variable is the food share at follow-up in the single-difference specifications, and the 
change in the food share in the double-difference specifications.  Specification (1) includes no controls; 
specification (2) includes the log of per capita expenditures and its square; specification (3) supplements this 
with controls for the log of household size, and variables for the number of family members in 5 age ranges (0 
to 5, 6 to 17, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, and 65 or older) interacted with gender; specification (4) also includes a vector 
of canton-level fixed effects.  In the instrumental variables specification in (5) the log of per capita expenditures 
and its square is instrumented with the log of non-food expenditures and its square.  This specification also 
includes the vector of demographic controls and canton fixed effects.  Standard errors in all specifications are 
corrected for within-parish clustering.  Sample size is 773 in all regressions.       
 
  23Table 4: Respondent’s report of what BDH transfers were spent on 
 
 All  Most  A  little  None 
Food  19.21 30.02 30.19 20.58 
Health 3.04  4.83  24.51  67.62 
Housing  0.90 1.26 4.33  93.50 
Education 4.29  6.44  23.79  65.47 
Transportation ---  0.72  38.81  60.47 
Clothes 4.51  6.86  22.74  65.88 
Goods for husband  --  --  1.65  98.35 
      
Note: Mothers were asked “How much of the bono was spent on [item listed in first column]?” Each row of the 
table shows the distribution of mothers’ responses to these questions. The sample consists of all mothers of 
children in the analysis sample who reported receiving BDH transfers. 
Source: Paxson and Schady (2007) 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
  Differences in program effects between female-only and mixed-adult 
households 












  Differences in program effects in mixed-adult households with varying 
levels of relative education of men and women 
Households where women have at least 







Households where women have less 







Note: The dependent variable is the change in the food share in all specifications.  Specification (1) includes no 
controls; specification (2) includes the change in the log of per capita expenditures and its square; specification (3) 
supplements this with controls for the change in the log of household size, and variables for the change in the number 
of family members in 5 age ranges (0 to 5, 6 to 17, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, and 65 or older) interacted with gender.  The 
regressions in the lower panel include 13 dummy variables for the mean years of schooling of adult men and women 
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